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9.1  Introduction 
In recent years, there has been growing American sentiment toward 
promoting  U.S. service industries and enhancing  their international 
competitiveness. At the 1982 ministerial meeting of the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the United States trade represen- 
tative (USTR) proposed for the first time that service transactions be 
added to the agenda for the next round of  multilateral trade negotia- 
tions. However, the developing  countries, led  by  Brazil  and  India, 
rejected this proposal. These countries have been reluctant to enter 
international negotiations on services for two reasons. First, U.S. ne- 
gotiators unintentionally conveyed the message that the liberalization 
of  trade in  services would  be a zero-sum game. Their eagerness to 
dismantle barriers to trade in services is perceived by many as simply 
serving the self-interest of large U.S. service corporations. Second, 
many GATT signatories are not enthusiastic about trade liberalization 
in this area. They fear that an international  system of rules for trade 
in services will interfere with their national policy objectives. 
Although the European Community (EC) shared many of  these ap- 
prehensions, it was instrumental in finding the compromise adopted at 
the 1982 meeting: contracting parties with an interest in services would 
undertake national studies of  problems in services trade. Most indus- 
trialized nations submitted reports for the November 1984 GATT ses- 
sion, and a working group was established  to  improve information about 
services. 
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During the following two years, the EC again played a crucial role 
in reconciling the strong American stand on including services in the 
new round with the insistence of the developing countries that services 
remain outside the scope of GATT. Under the compromise reached at 
the September 1986 ministerial meeting which launched the Uruguay 
Round, the multilateral trade negotiations  are to proceed along two 
parallel tracks: one for goods and one for services. The services ne- 
gotiations are aimed at establishing an international  set of rules that 
might eventually be incorporated into the GATT system. 
One sector of special concern to U.S. officials that illustrates  the 
problems  of  negotiating  in  the services area is  telecommunications 
services. U.S. interest in this field goes considerably beyond the per- 
ception that American firms have a competitive advantage in supplying 
telecommunications services. Telecommunications play a central role 
for almost all forms of services by providing an infrastructure for in- 
ternational trade in services. 
The United  States has devoted particular attention in recent years 
to issues of  telecommunications trade with  the EC.  The European 
telecommunications market-the  world’s second largest-tends  to be 
much less open than the American  market. This is a result  of  the 
difference in institutional arrangements on the two sides of the Atlantic. 
In European countries (as in most of  the world), telecommunications 
services are provided  largely  by  government monopolies  known as 
PTTs (Posts, Telegraph, and Telephones).  In contrast, telecommuni- 
cations services in the United States are supplied by private firms which 
operate in an increasingly competitive environment since deregulation 
was launched over a decade ago. 
U.S. interest in  telecommunications services also stems from the 
changes in this sector caused by an ongoing technological revolution. 
New information technologies are much faster, and it now costs less to 
process, store, retrieve, manipulate, and transmit data. Information 
technology now also encompasses  a wide array of convergent and linked 
information-goods  and  information-services  activities.  The informa- 
tion-goods industry includes computers, data recognition equipment, 
telecommunications equipment, and other related hardware, while the 
information-services  industry consists of computer services, informa- 
tion storage and retrieval, and telecommunications services. 
Information technology has led to the merger of data-processing and 
telecommunications activities into telematics,  which  involves both 
information-goods and information-services industries. As a result, the 
traditional dividing line between goods and services has become blurred. 
The extension of telematics internationally has given rise to transborder 
data flows that are similar to trade in information services and can be 
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data across  telecommunications networks. This  paper  analyzes  the 
trade policy issues of transborder data flows, with particular emphasis 
on US-EC trade relations. 
Although  there  is  a  general  trend  toward  information  intensity 
throughout the economy, it  varies by  industry.  Thus, the impact  of 
transborder data flows on international transactions  will  vary across 
industries. In particular, the possibilities for international trade in ser- 
vices have been greatly enhanced by  transborder data flows because 
of their “high information-technology content in both product and pro- 
cess” (Porter and Millar 1985, 154). However, the exact nature of the 
impact of transborder data flows will depend on the nature of services. 
I will argue in this paper that information flows enhance intrafirm trade 
in  some service industries and interfirm trade in others. 
Both intrafirm and arm’s-length information flows depend upon the 
efficient operation of telecommunications networks. How open should 
telecommunications services be to competitive forces? The United States 
and the European PTTs have two opposite views on this matter, with 
Europe favoring as wide a monopoly as is possible. This paper examines 
the implications  of  alternative  regulatory  environments  on telecom- 
munications trade. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: section 9.2 analyzes the impact 
of information flows on the structure of international trade in services, 
while section 9.3 examines the policy issues involved in the organi- 
zation of international telecommunications. The last section offers some 
perspectives on the potential for future trade negotiations in the tele- 
communications field. 
9.2  The Impact of Information Flows on Service Trade 
Information  technology, by increasing the speed and efficiency of 
transmitting information around the world, is rapidly changing the pre- 
vious  landscape of international service transactions.  It has created 
new services with substantial scope for international trade flows, namely 
information services. In addition, information technology has greatly 
enhanced the tradability of traditional services. 
Information services have as a primary function the collection, pro- 
cessing, and/or transmission of information in an electronic form. They 
include data-processing and data-base services. These services are es- 
sentially long-distance, linking a computer facility to a remote user via 
a communications system. Therefore, they are highly tradable. In their 
case, transborder data flows tend to be arm’s-length transactions be- 
tween the provider of the service and an unrelated user. 
Complementary innovations in data processing and telecommuni- 
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of  labor in  services in the same  way  that the  industrial  revolution 
affected agricultural and manufactured goods. “[A] key factor in the 
growth of world trade [was] a sequence of transportation innovations 
that opened up continental hinterlands, reduced the cost of transoce- 
anic shipping, and made possible the preservation of  perishable food 
products during extensive voyages over land and sea. These innova- 
tions included the rapid  growth of  the railroads after  1830, the ex- 
panding role of the iron steamship after 1850, and the introduction of 
refrigeration on both freight cars and steamships beginning in the 1870s. 
. . . With these complementary innovations, there began to emerge, 
by the end of the nineteenth century, a truly worldwide agricultural 
division of labor” (Rosenberg 1982, 58 and 251). 
The increased tradability of services is conceptually equivalent to a 
reduction in transport costs and has two consequences for the pattern 
of trade. On the one hand, reduced transportation costs make it feasible 
for service industries to reallocate certain activities to least-cost lo- 
cations and to export their products to other locations. On the other 
hand, reductions in transport costs make possible the greater exploi- 
tation of economies of  scale. In a world of low transport costs, the 
size of domestic markets plays less of a role in shaping trade patterns, 
and production can be concentrated in fewer locations. 
Several trade economists have recently drawn on the work by Hill 
(1977), who emphasizes the nonstorable nature of services: production 
and consumption must generally occur in the same location and at the 
same time. This characteristic provides the basis for the fact that ser- 
vices are generally not traded in the papers by Bhagwati (1985), Dear- 
dorff (1984), and Sampson and Snape (1985). 
Bhagwati (1985) and Sampson and Snape (1985) divide services into 
two categories: those that require the physical proximity of the pro- 
ducer and the consumer and those that do not; the latter are referred 
to as “separated”  services by Sampson and Snape. Within the group 
of services for which physical proximity is essential, a further distinc- 
tion  is  drawn between  those that  necessitate  the  movement  of  the 
producer, the consumer, or both. The distinction carries major policy 
implications. For “separated”  services, trade liberalization is similar 
to trade liberalization in goods. But for the majority of services, free- 
dom of international transactions would require freedom of movement 
of either producers or consumers. It is precisely the latter issue which 
has clouded the prospect for negotiations on service transactions. In 
particular, many countries are reluctant to open the Pandora’s box of 
rules governing foreign investment (involving so-called “rights of  es- 
tablishment” and “national treatment” regulations) and foreign labor. 
It has been argued that the advent of information technologies has 
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where in the world the buyer and the seller or user and provider are 
located, as long as their computers are linked together through modern 
communications systems” (Feketekuty and Hauser 1985, 7). 
My own view is that this argument needs to be qualified. The en- 
hanced tradability of services is partly offset by a quality-uncertainty 
problem that arises because of the intangible nature of services. Con- 
trary to most goods where buyers can rely on physical attributes to 
judge the quality of a product, with services it is reputation that plays 
an overriding role in the selection of suppliers. To be sure, uncertainty 
about  product  quality  is a feature of  markets for many goods, but 
services are “[v]irtually  all . . . impossible to evaluate until they are 
used” (Shapiro 1982,20). There is a continuum of services from highly 
tangible  ones (almost goods-like) to highly  intangible ones.  For in- 
stance, most  insurance services are highly intangible,  while routine 
transportation services tend to be very tangible. The more intangible 
the service, the more its market structure tends to be characterized by 
nonprice competition. 
The reputation of producing a quality product is also the major in- 
tangible asset of  service firms. As discussed in the vast literature on 
multinational enterprises (for recent surveys, see Caves 1982; Dunning 
and Rugman 1985; and Teece 1985), the possession of intangible assets 
creates an incentive to sell in foreign markets in order to maximize the 
rent that can be gained. Although this is equally true for both goods 
and services, there is a fundamental difference between the two. In 
the case of  most  goods, intangible  assets owned  by  producers are 
embodied in the physical attributes of the product. However, for service 
activities the product itself is intangible. Therefore, goods do not gen- 
erally require consumers to be close to producers for ascertaining qual- 
ity and can be exported to foreign markets. In contrast, services generally 
require such a close interaction between producers and consumers that 
they must often be produced in the markets where they are consumed. 
Several authors have noted that service firms often become multi- 
national in order to follow their customers (see Caves  1982 and ref- 
erences cited therein). Service firms tend to acquire an intangible asset: 
a quasi-contractual relation with their customers “based on trust that 
lowers the cost of contracting and the risks of opportunistic behavior. 
If  the service firm has such a quasi-contractual relation with a parent 
MNE (Multinational Enterprise), it enjoys a transactional advantage 
for supplying the  same service to the MNE’s foreign  subsidiaries” 
(Caves 1982, 11). 
The more  intangible a service, the more  difficult it  is to export, 
especially to an unrelated party. This proposition has two implications. 
First, the principle of comparative advantage might not apply to highly 
intangible services in the sense that the country with the lowest pro- 236  Andre Sapir 
duction cost might not be able to export a service for which it lacks 
reputation. Second, the degree of tangibility of  a service determines 
the channel for possible trade flows. The less intangible it is, the more 
likely it is that international trade will consist of  arm’s-length trans- 
actions between unrelated parties. Conversely, the more intangible a 
service, the more trade will tend to flow through intrafirm channels. 
In other words, the more intangible the service, the more transborder 
data flows can be expected to take place outside the international mar- 
ket place and within multinational firms. An important policy impli- 
cation is that, contrary to what might have been expected, transborder 
data flows have not eliminated the issues of  “rights of establishment” 
and “national  treatment,”  but  they have changed the nature of  the 
service establishment that is required to conduct business in a foreign 
country. 
9.3  Telecommunications Services 
9.3.1.  Telecommunications Services as an Infrastructure 
To what extent do telecommunications services serve as an inter- 
mediate input for other industries in the economy? In principle, the 
answer could be obtained from input-output tables that provide inter- 
industry linkages. However, in most countries (particularly in Europe), 
telephone and postal services are jointly operated so their activities 
cannot be distinguished in input-output tables. 
The United  States, where the businesses of  telephone and postal 
services are totally unrelated, is an exception. Consequently, one can 
use the 1977 input-output table of  the U.S. economy (disaggregated 
into 537 industries) to estimate the role of telecommunications services 
as an infrastructure input in the United States. 
Table 9.1 shows that the telecommunications sector sells 44  percent 
of  its output to intermediate users. The bulk of this demand comes 
from  service industries:  “wholesale  and retail  trade,”  “finance  and 
insurance,”  “business  services,”  and  “health,  education, etc.,”  ac- 
count for over 50 percent of  the output sold to industrial users. 
Table 9.2 examines the “telecommunications  intensity”  of various 
industries-that  is, the direct requirements of telecommunications ser- 
vices per dollar of industry output-of the various industries. The table 
reports only on industries with requirements of one percent or more. 
Service industries are obviously the largest relative users of telecom- 
munications inputs. In the case of  “business services” and “finance 
and insurance,”  inputs of  telecommunications services are about  2 
percent of output and over 5 percent of intermediate inputs. 237  Telecommunications Services 
Table 9.1  Distribution of the Telecommunications  Sector’s Output, 1977 
(millions of dollars) 
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Source: U .S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of  Economic Analysis, Detailed fnput- 
Output Structure of the US.  Ecomony, 1977, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1984). 
Table 9.2  Telecommunications Service Inputs as Share of Total and 
Intermediate Inputs in Selected Sectors (in percent) 
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Source: U .S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Detuiled fnput- 
Output Structure of the  U.S.  Economy, 1977, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
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It appears from these tables that telecommunications services, al- 
though required by nearly every industry, are used primarily by service 
industries. They are not only among the main customers of telecom- 
munications services, but also exhibit the highest degree of telecom- 
munications intensity. 
This conclusion applies to international as well as to domestic ac- 
tivities.  International transactions in services primarily involve trans- 
border data flows, either as a service activity per se (usually as interfirm 
flows), or as an infrastructure  input for other services (generally as 
intrafirm flows). Therefore the expansion of international service trans- 
actions depends crucially on the existence of an efficient telecommuni- 
cations network. 
9.3.2.  International Telecommunications Services; Institutional 
Framework 
Until  recently, there  has been  a consensus among countries  that 
telecommunications  services  are provided  most efficiently within  a 
country by a monopoly. The only difference in viewpoints was over 
what form of organization would ensure that the monopolist behaved 
in society’s best interest: either a regulated private firm (as in the United 
States and a handful of other countries) or a government-owned or- 
ganization (as the PTTs in Europe and most other countries). 
The key to the belief that a monopoly was needed was that each 
country  shared  the  same technology,  and  that  this technology was 
evolving at a relatively  slow pace. The monopoly principle was also 
extended from domestic to international markets. In effect, the inter- 
national market for telecommunications services became, and largely 
still is, a cartel of national monopolies that share the same technology 
and offer the same services. As one observer has noted, this market 
structure has prevented telecommunications services from being traded. 
“Far from encouraging countries to exchange different services, it in- 
stead has ensured that all countries produce the same services. The 
capability of producing these services has then been shared among all 
countries, not traded”  (Reid 1985, 18). 
In recent years, this traditional concept of the international telecom- 
munications network has been disturbed by a rapid succession of in- 
novations in information technologies. The resulting challenge to the 
traditional view has come almost entirely from the United States, where 
the innovations have led to a series of  changes in the regulatory en- 
vironment. As a result, the structure of the U.S. telecommunications 
market has shifted during the past decade from a regulated monopoly 
toward one with intense interfirm competition. The more rapid changes 
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several imbalances in the international network, with consequences for 
trade in telecommunications equipment and services. 
9.3.3.  Trade Policy Issues in Telecommunications Services 
The traditional network offered homogeneous public telecommuni- 
cations services accessible to all those with the requisite hardware. How- 
ever, the development of new information technologies and computer- 
to-computer data communications created specific needs for which the 
public network was ill-suited. In response to a need for transborder data 
flows, countries agreed to provide private leased lines that offered cer- 
tain services not available on public networks (for example more reliable 
and faster services-see  Ergas 1984). As indicated by Antonelli (1984), 
private leased lines are  particularly effective channels for intrafirm trans- 
border data flows that rely on standardized or compatible hardware and 
software. “Moreover, leased lines guarantee greater appropriability and 
thus greater security for regular ongoing flows of  information among 
[MNE] headquarters and affiliates” (Antonelli 1984, 337). In contrast, 
for transborder data flows between unrelated parties (relying on heter- 
ogenous hardware and software), the use of public networks is more ap- 
propriate, provided that they can supply sufficiently high-quality data 
communications. 
Outside of the United States, private leased lines are provided under 
conditions that preserve the monopoly  character of  telecommunica- 
tions. They must be denied at any time if they infringe on the services 
available on the public network. In particular, the use of private leased 
lines is limited to subscribers, who are then prohibited from reselling 
telecommunications services. 
The rule requiring that leased lines be used solely for the subscriber’s 
internal communications has been challenged by the emergence of new 
services that combine computer processing and telecommunications. 
In order to preserve  the spirit of  the rule, a distinction was drawn 
between services that primarily  involve computer processing-data- 
processing and data-base services-and  those that engage mostly  in 
data transmission, referred  to as enhanced  or value-added services, 
such as electronic mail, videotext, and protocol conversion. Under the 
interpretation adopted in most countries, the rule forbids the use of 
private leased lines for providing enhanced services. 
The situation is quite different in the United States, where present 
regulatory conditions distinguish between two types of communications 
services: basic services, which only transmit information through the 
telecommunications network, and enhanced services, which also mod- 
ify that information. Basic services are provided by monopolies subject 
to regulations; enhanced services are provided  by  suppliers in com- 240  Andre Sapir 
petition with each other who have unrestricted access to private leased 
lines and who can resell their unused transmission capacity. 
Therefore the previous consensus among countries has given way 
to a disagreement about the extent to which telecommunications ser- 
vices should be competitive. The United States and the European PTTs 
hold opposite views on this matter, the latter arguing for a monopoly 
that would supply both basic and enhanced services. 
This lack of international consensus is hampering the emergence of 
trade in (enhanced) telecommunications services. As Reid (1985) con- 
cludes, “the development of trade is a two-step process; first a variety 
of services must be allowed to emerge within individual countries, then 
these services must be permitted to be sold internationally” (p. 35). 
An illustration of the type of dispute that has arisen because of the 
lack of a consensus in telecommunications is the disagreement between 
the United States and Germany on Bundespost restrictions on the use 
of private leased lines for transborder data flows. The Bundespost forces 
firms to link their private leased lines to public data networks, requires 
that data processing occur in Germany before such data is transmitted 
across international leased lines, and charges usage-sensitive rates, in 
addition to fixed charges, on some international leased lines. The Ger- 
man position is that the Bundespost must maintain its monopoly over 
all telecommunications services in  order to provide them most effi- 
ciently (the natural monopoly argument) and protect its revenues (the 
cross-subsidization or social equity argument). On the other hand, the 
United States maintains that the German policy encourages inefficiency 
and violates the 1985 Declaration on Transborder Data Flows by which 
OECD (Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and Development) 
members pledged to promote international data flows. 
The natural monopoly issue has raised considerable debate in Europe 
concerning U.S. deregulatory and divestiture experience. Some (mostly 
PTT officials) view this experience with skepticism because of regu- 
latory confusion and the deterioration of universal service. Others (many 
officials of the EC Commission and the British government) would like 
to follow the U.S. lead toward increased competition on the grounds 
of better and cheaper services and the stimulation of innovation. But, 
so far, there is no serious study of the production characteristics of the 
European telecommunications industry that could help reveal whether 
or not the natural monopoly argument is appropriate. 
However, there are studies of the rate structure in Europe. A recent 
analysis shows that substantial welfare losses result from the practice 
by the Bundespost of setting prices for local and long distance calls at 
10 and 140 percent, respectively, above marginal costs. The huge profits 
arising from these telecommunications services are used to cover def- 241  Telecommunications Services 
icits from postal activities and as revenue sources for the general gov- 
ernment budget (see Neumann, Schweizer, and von Weizsacker 1985). 
Particular trade disputes between Europe and America on telecom- 
munications services are part of a wider issue. The unanimous inter- 
national consensus in favor of monopoly organizations for providing 
national  telecommunications  services  has  been  shattered  by  rapid 
changes in information technology. The challenge facing the two trading 
blocs will be to develop a new consensus on the international provision 
of telecommunications services, taking account of the new technolog- 
ical environment. 
9.4  Conclusions 
This paper has argued that telecommunications services are the cor- 
nerstone of a new information technology that can transform the scope 
and nature of international trade in services. Depending upon whether 
services are more or less intangible, their enhanced tradability is likely 
to involve intrafirm or arm’s-length information flows. In either case, 
an efficient telecommunications network needs to be established, draw- 
ing lessons from the U.S. experience that allows more competition in 
the provision of both services and equipment. The alternative for Eu- 
rope and other areas is to be left behind, not only in telecommunications 
services but also in many other service activities. 
One conclusion of this study is that domestic policy changes-break- 
ing up domestic monopolies in  services and equipment-rather  than 
new international rules, hold the key to international competition and 
trade in telecommunications services. This has important implications 
for the multilateral trade negotiations on services launched at Punta 
del Este in September 1986. 
In almost all countries, services are more regulated by the govern- 
ment than most other activities. It is generally thought that the very 
nature of  services necessitates  regulating entry into the industry  in 
order to achieve optimal economic efficiency or other national objec- 
tives. There are two reasons why free entry might result in wasteful 
allocations of resources. First, the intangible nature of many services 
(banking, engineering, insurance, etc.) requires the imposition of min- 
imum standards in order to prevent welfare losses to consumers arising 
from low-quality services.  Second, the production characteristics of 
some services (communications, transport, etc.) implies that excessive 
competition might be detrimental to welfare because of an inefficient 
scale of operation. 
Although government regulations of services are imposed for purely 
domestic reasons, they may also have repercussions on international 242  Andre Sapir 
transactions.  Rules aimed at protecting consumers make it very diffi- 
cult, if  not impossible, for foreign corporations to obtain “rights  of 
establishment” or to be granted “national treatment.”  In principle, all 
matters involving discriminatory practices could be dealt with by ex- 
tending existing GATT rules to services. But the main problem is the 
rights-of-establishment issue, which is not covered by these rules. 
Another instance  is when  national  regulatory practices-although 
they might be nondiscriminatory-diverge  sufficiently to prevent in- 
ternational transactions from occurring, as in telecommunications ser- 
vices.  Here  the  issues  are  primarily  domestic  matters  involving 
regulatory philosophies. This point has been recognized by the min- 
isterial declaration of Punta del Este which indicates that rules for trade 
in  services must respect the policy  objectives of  national  laws and 
regulations. However, it remains to be seen how much progress can 
be achieved along such lines by the 92 GATT signatories. It might be, 
instead, that negotiations involving regulatory issues would be better 
conducted, for the moment, among countries that share common eco- 
nomic situations and principles. The OECD, therefore, might be a more 
appropriate forum for such negotiations. 
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